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DEPENDENCE AND IMPERIALISM IN INDIA*
Thomas E. Weisskopf
Introduction
Of all the ex-colonial nations that gained political Independence in .
the aftermath of World War II, India appeared the most likely to escape
foreign economic domination and pursue an independent path of economic
development. First, with a large and varied endowment of natural resources
and a huge population, India was not bound to depend heavily on external
resources or external markets. And even though India emerged from colonial
rule as one of the poorest countries of the world, its continental size
offered a vast potential for mobilizing domestic resources.
Secondly, India at independence had already experienced some degree of
industrialization, and a substantial share of modern business enterprise
had come under the control of indigenous capitalists. Although factory es-
tablishments and mines accounted for only 6.5% of the national product and
employed only 2.6% of the labor force in 1950,1 modern industry was, in
absolute terms, quite important. Furthermore, since the early nineteenth
century, Indian capitalists had gradually improved their position vis-a-vis
foreign (predominantly British) capital. A good deal of British capital
followed the retreat of the colonial govcrnment to London, and by the early
1950’s only a third of corporate business in India was still financially
controlled by foreigners (mostly British).2 Thus, India attained indepen-
dence with a significant indigenous capitalist class that had a history of
considerable antagonism towards foreign capitalist competitors. Unlike
most other ex-colonial nations, India was not completely dependent on
foreign business enterprise or managerial expertise. 
,.
Thirdly, at independence there already existed a significant class of
indigenous professionals and a.dministrators. This British educated elite
had assumed increasingly important--though always subordinate--positions in
the professions and in the colonial administration. Such educated and
Westernized Indians naturally came to resent their enforced subordination
and figured prominently among the leaders of the Indian· nationalist move-
ment. Their own professional competence, combined with their anti-colonial
1:Copyright@1972 by Random House, Inc. From the forthcoming book
Imperialism in Asia, edited by Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, to be pub-
lished by Pantheon Books, a division of Random House, Inc., in fall 1973.
In preparing and revising this paper, I have benefitted greatly from
the assistance of Larry Lifschultz and from the comments of many friends
and colleagues. I would like to acknowledge particularly the helpful sug-
gestions of Peter Bell, Noam Chomsky, Edward Friedman, Michael Meeropol,
Mark Selden, and the participants of the Harvard seminar of the Union for
Radical Political Economics.
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perspective, contributed both to the feasibility and to the desirability of
limiting the role of foreign personnel and technical assistance in indepen-
dent India.
Finally, the pronouncements of the leaders of the nationalist movement,
who subsequently became the rulers of independent India, emphasized the
restriction of foreign economic interests. Jawaharlal Nehru, the leading
spokesman on economic matters and, as Prime Minister, India’s most powerful
political leader, set the tone for Indian economic policy by committing the
ruling Congress Party to a &dquo;socialistic pattern of society.&dquo;3 Nehru’s con-
cept of socialism involved a strong emphasis on economic self-reliance to
be achieved by centralized economic planning and a foreign policy of non-
alignment. The government was clearly on record in favor of a path of
economic development in which foreign aid, foreign private capital, and
foreign personnel would play at most a minor and subordinate role.
Yet, in spite of the seemingly favorable conditions at the time of in-
dependence, the Indian economy soon became heavily dependent upon the
capitalist powers. By the 1960’s, foreign aid and investment had become
critical to India’s development plans, and foreign officials, businessmen,
and advisors had come to play important roles in India’s strategy of de-
velopment. While this Western influence was less blatant and comprehensive
than the earlier Britisn colonial control, it constituted, nonetheless a
significant new form of Western economic imperialism.* How did all of this
come about? In this paper I propose to examine and to explain the process
whereby India’s initial commitment to self-reliant development yielded, as
in so many other Third World countries, to a strategy of growth dependent
upon the major capitalist powers.
I. Toward Self-Reliant Development? 
.
Few people were under any illusions about the magnitude of the task of
economic development facing India at the time of its independence in 1947.
Two centur~es of colonial rule had brought about little, if any, growth in
India’s per capita income, which was lower than in almost any other part of
the world. The colonial 1 government had invested some resources in railroad
construction, irrigation canals, and related infrastructural facilities,
and a limited amount of modern industry had developed. The economy and the
society, however, remained overwhelmingly agricultural, and the great
majority of Indians eked out a precarious living by cultivating land under
exploitative conditions with very inefficient techniques.4
Under such circumstances, a self-reliant strategy of economic development
*Throughout this essay I shall I be concerned with economic rather than
other forms of imperialism. By economic imperialism I mean the exercise of
power by nationals of one country to affect economic conditions within
another country. Thus I shall not be concerned witf the impact of foreign
powers on such issues as India’s international political relations.
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called for organized effort on an unprecedented scale. Clearly the
national government--now finally in Indian hands--would have to spearhead
economic growth. Jawaharlal Nehru was particularly keen on establishing a .
framework for systematic centralized planning, to be implemented by means
of a strong public sector encompassing many key industries as well as a
private sector subject to careful government control. In rural areas, the
government was to initiate an agrarian revolution which would free the cul- .
tivator from his innumerable social and economic burdens and release his
energy for productive agriculture.5
It was not only India’s political leadership that recognized the need
for a strong state to promote economic growth. The Indian business class,
having suffered through decades of discrimination at the hands of the col-
onial government, looked to the new Indian government for protection and
stimulation. Business leaders were well aware that Indian private enter-
prise was not strong enough to promote economic growth without substantial
aid and public investment, and they generally supported the ki.nd of mixed
capitalist economy in which a strong public sector would be complementary
to a growing private sector.6 Both business and government leaders were
determined at the outset to rely largely on India’s own resources and to
limit the role of foreign ca~ital; in this endeavor the state would neces- .
sarily play a critical I role.
In the early years following independence, however, the role of the
state in the economy was quite limited. The disruptive effects of the par- .
tition of the subcontinent, and the inherent difficulties of establishing a
new system of rule, placed a premium on stability and consolidation in the
minds of the political leadership. Far from formulating a long-range policy
. geared to self-reliant development., the government concentrated on restor-
ing production levels as rapidly as possible. Earlier pronouncements
about nationalizing key industries in the private sector were set aside as
the government relied on existing private enterprise to boost production.
With the publication of the first Industrial Policy Resolution (defining 
’
the respective roles of the public and private sectors) in 1948, and subse-
quent government actions designed to stimulate private enterprise, it be-
came clear that Indian private capital had little to.fear from the kind of
&dquo;socialism&dquo; practiced by the political leadership.8 .
Government policy with respect to foreign capital followed a similar .
pattern of retreat from initially strong positions. Although existing
foreign enterprise (mostly British, and much of it in plantations and ser-
vices9) was never threatened with expropriation, the Government-of India
at first did not encourage new foreign investment. The Industrial Policy
Resolution of 1948 promised strict regulation of foreign capi1:al. &dquo;in the
national_ interest,&dquo; and India was generally unwilling to accord foreign In-
vestors the kind of conditions they expected. Only a year later, however,
Nehru announced a new more liberal policy in a Statement to Parliament, and
by 1953 a London business weekly affirmed that &dquo;the terms on which capital
can be invested in India now match almost exactly the conditions laid down
in the ’Code’ (of the U.S. International Chamber of Commerce).&dquo;10 .
56
In spite of the progressive relaxation of restrictions, foreign in-
vestors remained suspicious of the Indian investment climate. During the
first decade after independence there was little net inflow of foreign pri-
vate capital, with the significant exception of the oil 1 industry. In the
early 1950’s, the Indian govermment negotiated agreements with three major
Western oil companies (Esso, Burmah-Shell and Caltex) to set up branch re-
fineries on terms extremely favorable to the-investors.11
While the official attitude toward foreign private capital mellowed
quite rapidly, the attitude toward foreign public aid remained much firmer
throughout the first decade. The urge to avoid reliance on external aid
was stren.gthened by American efforts to use a wheat loan in 1950 to pres-
sure India into modifying its neutral stance in the Korean War.l2 In
public statements Indian leaders extolled the virtues of self-sufficiency,
and sought to minimize the role of foreign aid in financing development
programs.
With the establishment of the National Planning Commission in 1950,
and the i naugu ra t i on of the First Five Year Plan (1951-56) a year later,
the government moved to implement its long-heralded policy of systematic
planning for self-reliant development. The First Plan proved to be very
modest in scope, consisting essentially of a set of projects most of which
were already slated to be carried out by various governmental agencies.l3
It was only in the mid-fifties, as the process of formulating the Second
Five Year Plan (1956-61) got underway, that a concerted effort was made to
define a new strategy of economic development. 
’
Several circumstances combined to favor a new strategy.l4 First of all,
the overall economic situation had improved markedly since independence; a
couple of good monsoons and a boom in private business activity produced an
atmosphere of optimism among economic planners. Secondly, there was a
growing popular demand that the Congress Party begin to fulfill 1 its pledge
to bring about a &dquo;socialistic pattern of society.&dquo; This demand was rein-
forced after 1953 by key electoral challenges from the opposition social-
ist and communist parties. Finally, the Soviet Union began in late 1954 to
demonstrate interest in developing economic relations with India. Accept-
ing the domestic political status quo and displaying strong support for the
Nehru government at the expense of the Communist Party of India, the Soviet
government offered technical and financial assistance for major public sec-
tor industrial projects--notably the first big public sector steel plant.
This Soviet display of friendship and assistance greatly encouraged those
planners--among them Nehru himself--who favored large-scale planning and
rapid industrialization of the kind achieved by the Soviet Union.
The initial formulation of the Second Five Year Plan owed much to the
efforts of Professor P.C. Mahalanobis, head of the Indian Statistical
Institute and principal economic adviser to Nehru, who prepared an influ-
ential &dquo;Plan Frame&dquo; outline published in March 1955.15 Mahalanobis’ Plan
Frame called for the promotion of rapid growth &dquo;by increasing the scope
and importance of the public sector&dquo; and through the development of heavy
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industries &dquo;to strengthen the foundations of economic independence.&dquo;16
Although the final version of the Second Five Year Plan involved some
modification of Mahalanobis’ original suggestions, it did represent a dra-
matic departure from the conservative economic policies of earl ier years.
’ 
Planned public expenditure for the Second Plan was more than twice as
great as for the First Plan; the outlay on industry increased almost five-
fold, and the share of the public sector in total investment was to rise
from 44% to over 60%.17 At the same time that this ambitious plan strategy
was being formulated, the government undertook other measures to bring the
economy more directly under state control. The (domestic) Imperial I Bank
and life insurance companies were nationalized, a major Companies Act (of
1956) was passed to permit closer government regulation of private enter-
prise, and a new State Trading Corporation was set up. In April, 1956,
the Indian Parliament adopted a new Industrial Policy Resolution that was
somewhat more emphatic about the role of the public sector than the first
Resolution of 1948.18 More than at any time since independence, it
appeared that the government might take decisive control of the direction
of the economy.
Formulating elaborate development plans and promising large government
expenditures are relatively easy tasks under any circumstances, and this
was especially true in the optimistic Indian climate of the mid-fifties.
The more difficult and more crucial question, however, was whether the
necessary financial resources could be raised. In 1955 a Taxation Enquiry
Commission issued a report calling for major fiscal reforms to increase
tax revenues.19 But it soon became clear that the major increases in
planned government expenditures would outstrip the anticipated rise in tax
revenues. It was expected that additional financial resources could be
generated from the profits of public enterprises, from a moderate dose of.
deficit financing, and from foreign aid. However estimates of foreign
assistance remained fairly low, and the Minister of Commerce and Industry,
T.T. Krishnamachari, reflected the prevailing spirit of self-sufficiency
by categorically opposing foreign aid.20 Even under optimistic assumptions
about t various sources of finance, there remained a significant gap between
anticipated outlays and resources for the Plan--yet it was hoped that taxa-
tion could be further stepped up to meet any need as it arose.
Related to the problem of financing the large Second Plan was the prob
lem of covering its foreign exchange requirements. The strategy of rapid
industrialization with emphasis on large-scale projects in heavy industry
was bound to generate rapidly increasing demands for imported raw materials
and capital equipment. It was hoped that the foreign exchange to pay for
these could be obtained from increased export t earnings, from the curtail-
ment of--non-essential imports and from the use of some of India’s sizeable
stock.of accumulated sterling balances. Another potential source of
foreign exchange was, of course, foreign capital, but the planners did not
want to rely excessively on foreign aid and the current inflow of foreign
private capital was too limited to warrant much optimism.
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Not surprisingly, the Western capitalist powers severely criticized
, 
the Indian planning effort. A 1956 World Bank Mission condemned the .,.
Second Plan as over-ambitious.21 Subsequently the Chairman of the Bank,
Eugene Black, addressed a letter to T.T. Krishnamachari berating the Indian
planners for failing to accord a.sufficient role to private enterprise and
’ 
urging especially more positive measures to facilitate foreign private in-
vestment. Black went on to issue a stern warning:
I
We feel that we would have to consider the pace and the scale 
’
of our further loan operation in India from time to time in
the light of economic conditions and prospects and taking in-
to consideration the economic policies pursued by your
Government.22
This letter did not shake the confidence of the Government in its policies; 
.
it was in effect rejected by Krishnamachari. For the time being, at least,
Indian decision-makers were in no mood to accomodate to the wishes of the .
Wor 1 d Bank.
II. The Drift to Dependence 
’
Unfortunately for the proponents of the new strategy, the big plans
and the bold rhetoric of the mid-fifties came crashing down to earth within
a year after the Second Five Year Plan was initiated. The clearest symptom
of the problem was an unprecedented foreign exchange crisis. The deficit
on India’s balance of trade, which had averaged about $200 million a year
during the First Plan period, suddenly rocketed to almost $1 billion in
1956-57 and reached a level of more than $1.3 billion in 1957-58.23 A
large part of these deficits had to be paid out of.lndia’s sterling balances,
which dwindled from $1.~ billion to $?00 million within two vears.
lhe dramatic increases in India’s trade deficit were due to corres-
ponding increases in imports at a time when export earnings remained static.
This surge of imports can be attributed in considerable part to the failure
of the Indian Government to exercise the control over the private sector
necessary for the fulfillment of the Second Plan.24 In the beginning of
the Plan period the booming private sector had run into supply shortages,
especially in the domestic provision of basic industrial goods. Anxious to
obtain imported goods before foreign exchange itself became limited (a
likely prospect in view of the size of the new Plan), private businesses
indulged in an import spree. Far from restraining this spree, the Govern-
ment handed out import licenses liberally and actually contributed to the
problem with its own excessive use of foreign exchange. Only in 1957, when
the drain of foreign exchange reserves had reached crisis proportions, did
the Government begin to clamp down on imports. By the end of 1957, only .
&dquo;essential&dquo; imports were being licensed. But the damage had already been
done: before many of the projects of the Second Plan had even begun, India
had squandered most of its foreign exchange reserves.
The foreign exchange crisis was matched by a crisis in financial
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resource mobilization for the Second Plan. Total development expenditures
by the central and state governments rose from 6.9% to 10.2% of net
national product (NNP) from 1955-56 to 1957-58, contributing heavily to an
increase in total government expenditures from 14.0% to 17.7% of NNP.25
But tax revenues increased only from 7.7% to 9.2% of NNP in the same period,
and revenues from other sources barely changed at all. As a result, the
overall government budgetary deficit increased from 1.6% to an unprecedented
4.4% of NNP. The initial optimism about financing the Second Plan had
proved hopelessly naive.
The response of the government to these crises was to steer the econo-
my In quite a different direction than that intended by the formulators of
the Second Plan. In the first place, public expenditure on the Plan was
cut back significantly.26 Yet, even with this cutback it was clear that
major efforts would have to be made to provide an adequate base of finan-
cial resources and foreign exchange for the rest of the Plan. Unable or
unwilling to envisage any other course of action, the government turned its
eyes toward the West.
Within a year after T.T. Krjshnamachari had rejected the letter from
Eugene Black and questioned the need for any foreign aid at all, the tune
had changed.27 In the summer of 1957, Krishnamachari himself (now Minister
of Finance) led an official 1 delegation on a tour of Western capitals in
the first systematic effort to attract financial aid on a massive scale.
This government effort was complemented in the same year by a foreign tour
on the part of the Indian Industrial Mission, led by G.D. Birla (head of
one of India’s two wealthiest business houses) and including many of the
most powerful representatives of Indian corporate business. Public
officials and private businessmen alike sought to alleviate Western fears
about Indian &dquo;socialism&dquo; and to affirm India’s enthusiasm for an inflow of
foreign capital. H.V.R. lyengar, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India,
explained to an audience of industrialists in California that:
The ’Socialism’ contemplated in India does not, by any stretch
of the imagination, mean communism; it does not mean state
capitalism....lt is a system under which private competitive
enterprise has and will continue to have a vital role to play; .’
it is a s-ystem which respects private property and provides
for the payment of compensation if such property is acquired
by the state. I submit there is nothing in the system which
should be repugnant to the social conscience of the USA.28
And G.D. 8irla-assured an American Council for Commerce and Industry that
the Government of India was &dquo;favorable and indeed much more receptive than
in 1948&dquo; to foreign capital.29 This was not mere rhetoric. In specific
agreements, new tax concessions and formal invitations, the Government of
India made-clear that foreign majority ownership of joint ventures was
. acceptable and that foreign capital was welcome in a number of industries
previously reserved for the state.
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The response from the West was everything that anxious government
officials and businessmen could have hoped for. The urgent appeals for
help galvanized a small 1 but influential pro-India lobby in the Uni ted 
&dquo;’ ,.
States Into action aimed at a massive step-up in American foreign aid.30 
’
The World Bank, apparently satisfied that the recent changes in economic
policy were moving India in the right direction, set up a permanent mission
in New Delhi in late 1957 and organized a prompt and substantial loan oper-
ation that enabled India to meet its immediate foreign exchange obligations.
In August, 1958, the Bank gave institutional form to Western assistance by
establishing a Consortium for India (known popularly as the Aid-India Club).
Comprising representatives of the major Western donor nations as well as
the World Bank and its affiliate, the International Development Association,
the Consortium was to meet at least once every year to assess India’s de-
velopment plans and to coordinate the allocation of loans and grants.
Thanks largely to the efforts of the Consortium, the level of gross aid
utilized by India jumped from $425 million in the First Plan period to over
$3 billion in the Second Plan period.31 This foreign aid financed roughly
25% of total public development expenditure and a slightly larger percen-
tage of total imports during the Second Plan.
. Although foreign public aid came much more quickly and in much larger
amounts, foreign private capital also began to flow in increasing quanti-
ties to India as the Second Plan neared its end. Abandoning its earlier
enthusiasm for self-sufficiency, the government from 1958 on put pressure
on Indian firms to associate themselves financially and technically with
foreign partners. In order to obtain investment and import licenses,
Indian firms found it advantageous and often essential to seek agreements
with foreign firms who could provide the foreign exchange to cover the im-
port costs of a project. Encouraged by the growing economic links between
India and the Western capitalist powers, foreign firms entered increasing-
ly into joint ventures with their Indian counterparts. The number of
government licenses for new enterprises involving foreign financial parti-
cipation rose from an average of about 10 per year in the period 1951-57
to over 30 in 1958-61 and over 50 in 1962-63; in more than half the cases
control was granted to the foreign partner.32 This growth of foreign par-
ticipation in Indian business was reflected in a rise in the average annual
level of long-term foreign capital inflow and a corresponding growth of the
value of long-term foreign investment assets in the private sector.33
India’s increasing dependence on Western assistance was reflected in
agriculture as well as in industry. While the agricultural sector had
recorded some growth in output during the 1950’s (slightly over 3% per
year), more than half of the growth was due to the expansion of acreage.
It was clear that an adequate rate of growth in the future would depend on
more rapid improvement in agricultural productivity.34 The possible -
reasons for the limited improvement in productivity are divcrse and diffi-
cult to evaluate comparatively. They include the limiled atlention given
to agriculture vis-a-vis industry in the Second Plan, the failure of the
much-heralded rural Community Development Program to reach most peasants,
and the widespread ineffectiveness of the land reform bills that had been
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passed by state legislatures to fulfill I the Congress pledge of &dquo;land to the
tiller.&dquo; In short, the government had neither brought about its promised
agrarian revolution nor had it provided the massive infusion of agricultural
inputs and credit which might have improved productivity even in the ab-
sence of significant institutional change.
Within the agricultural sector, food production was particularly dis-
appointing. As the demand for foodgrains outstripped the domestic supply,’
India became increasingly dependent on imports to feed its growing popula-
tion. Throughout the 1950’s there was an unmistakable upward trend in food
imports, which averaged 1.8 million tons annually during the First Plan
period, 3.8 million tons during the Second Plan period, and reached an un-
precedented level of 5.1 million tons in 1960.35 .
.~ In the context of the overall foreiqn exchange shortage that developed
in the Second Plan, the burden of food in~ports became increasingly onerous.
Under these circumstances, the availability of surplus agricultural
commodities from the United States under Public Law 480 proved irresistible.36
Most of the commodities shipped under PL 480 are provided free of charge to
the Indian government for subsequent sale in the domestic market. Between .
85 and 90% of the rupee proceeds--known as counterpart funds--accrue to
the government t in the form of long-term loans (repayable in rupees to the
U.S.) for mutually agreed upon development projects. The remainder of the
counterpart funds--as well I as the debt service on the loans--is held in a
rupee account by the U.S. government for local administrative expenses.
The PL 480 program thus channels aid to India in a manner very advantageous
to the two governments involved. The U.S. government simply disposes of
surplus commodities that it has already obliged taxpayers to buy from
American farmers, and it accumulates and spends rupees in India while at
the same time exercising some leverage over development expenditures by
the Indian government. The latter, in turn, gains substantial 1 budgetary
resources from the sale of the surplus commodities while reducing the
severity of food crises.
’ 
Commodity assistance to India began in 1955 but reached significant
proportions only after the foreign exchange crisis in 1957. During the
Second Plan period as a whole, the total value of PL 480 assistance
amounted to $1.05 billion dollars, representing approximately one third of
the total value of gross aid utilized.37 PL 480 food imports accounted for
about 60% of overall foodgrain imports during the Second Plan and con-
tributed significantly to the stabilization of food grain prices.38 It
was clear that unless major steps were taken to increase the rate of growth
of agriculture Indian dependence on imported food would continue to exac-
erbate an already difficult foreign exchange problem.
As the formulation of the Third Five Year Plan (1961-66) got under way
in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, Indian planners had few illusions
. about the extent of their r dependence on external assistance.39 The ruling
Congress Party was still 1 committed to rapid economic growth as a general
objective, and to a major role for the state in achieving that objective.
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Thus, an ambitious target was established for the Third Plan: $21.9 bill-
ion of net investment for the economy as a whole, of which about 60% was to
be in the public sector. Including both current outlay and capital in-
vestment, total public development expenditures were to rise from an actual
figure of $9.7 billion in the Second Plan to $15.8 billion in the Third.
The financing of these expenditures was linked clearly to anticipated
inflows of foreign capital. The planners recognized that existing taxation
would barely cover current government expenditures already committed, and
they projected additional taxation of $3.6 billion to be raised during the
Plan period.40 But even after stretching as optimistically as possible
this and other sources of revenue, there remained a gap of $4.6 billion
which was explicitly sought in external aid. In fact, the cumulative trade .
deficit had been estimated in the Draft Outline of the Third Plan to reach
$6.7 billion.41 As a scholar of Indian planning has observed, &dquo;Essentially,
this was an advance bill 1 presented to the ’consortium’ and other foreign
powers presumed to be interested in the Third Plan’s success.&dquo;42
Foreign powers did in fact foot most of this bill--but, as will become
evident later, not without extracting a significant quid pro quo. Although
the real value of public outlay fell somewhat below the targeted level,
gross foreign aid utilized during the Third Plan period doubled from its
Second Plan level to $6 billion dollars.43 Foreign aid financed 30% of
total public development expenditures and nearly one half of total imports.
Debt service on prior foreign loans claimed only $260 mi 11 ion during the
Third Plan period, so that the net inflow of aid was only slightly lower
than the gross inflow. Of the $6 billion in gross aid, more than 90% came
from members of the Consortium and less than 10% from the Soviet bloc
countries. Thirty percent of the aid was accounted for by PL 480 assistance
from the United States, which financed the bulk of~lndials growing food-
grain imports. The production of food grew very slowly during the Third
Plan period, and average annual foodgrain imports rose to 6.5 million tons--
about twice the level during the Second Plan.44
The growth in India’s dependence on Western aid was matched by the
rapidly growing role of foreign private enterprise in the Indian economy.
The value of outstanding long-term foreign investment in the private sec-
tor, which had increased from $930 million in December 1955 to $1.3 billion
in December 1960, accelerated to $2.2 billion by March 1966.45 This growth 
46was marked by two significant shifts in the structure of foreign investment.
First, the share of manufacturing industry rose from 29% of the total in
1955 to 51% in 1966. Second, the share of British capital declined from
83% in 1955 to 51% in 1966, while the share of American capital rose from
9% to 23% in the same period..Foreign investors were clearly becoming much
more interested in manufacturing than in the older extractive and service
sectors of the economy, and American capital was gradually eroding the
earlier dominance of British capital.
In the mid-1960’s, foreign branches and foreign-controlled companies
incorporated in India accounted for approximately 25% of India’s total
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private non-financial corporate assets.47 But the true significance of
foreign private enterprise is understated by such figures which identify
foreign control with ownership of at least 40% of share capita1.48 The in-
creasing involvement of foreign capital in manufacturing industries,
typically in the form of joint ventures with Indian capital, has led to
many instances of collaboration in which the Indian firm retains financial
control but depends on technical assistance from its foreign partner. The
number of government approvals for technical collaboration with foreign
firms increased from an annual averag4 of roughly 35 in the period 1948-55to 100 in 1956-59 and 350 in 1960-65. 9 Most such collaboration agree-
ments involve little or no financial investment by the foreign partner, who
is rewarded by annual- payments of royalties and various technical and ser-
vice fees. But the foreign role in management and decision-making is often
critical even where foreign equity participation is negligible.50
However the significance is measured, it is clear that Western public
officials and private businessmen assumed increasingly important roles in
the Indian economy from the late 1950’s by virtue of India’s increasing
dependence on Western public and private assistance. With interests of
their own to defend and to promote, it is hardly surprising that these
foreigners attempted to exercise the power which their critical roles con-
ferred upon them.
III. Case Studies in Economic Imperialism 
’
A few preliminary points deserve emphasis before some specific cases
are examined. Whenever there is a Western interest in a particular policy,
there is bound to be a similar interest on the part of at least some
Indians. Indeed, the policies promoted by Western capitalist powers are
often intended precisely to create or strengthen Indian classes with simi-
lar interests. Thus, policy differences rarely involve an alignment of
Westerners on one side and Indians on the other side of an issue. Rather,
the typical case of economic imperialism is one in which Western power is
used to influence decisions in favor of one side of a domestic policy de-
. bate, bringing support to that group of Indians whose own views and/or
interests are found most congenial. ·
In contrast to the heterogeneity of Indian interests, the Western in-
terest in India tends to be homogeneous because the interested community
is small and closely-knit, consisting mainly of public officials and pri-
vate businessmen. Articulated by the World Bank and the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) on behalf of the Aid-India
Club, the consensus of Western officials and businessmen is that India
should develop along capitalist lines by giving maximum latitude to private
enterprise and opening the economy as widely as possible to trade and in-
vestment from other capitalist nations. This outlook results in an align-
ment of the Western powers with Indian capitalists both in urban and rural
areas, especially those who are associated with foreign capital. At the
same time, it brings the Western powers into conflict with the Indian
government to the extent that the latter attempts to increase India’s .
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economic independence by restricting private enterprise or interfering with
the operation of market forces.
Agricultural Policy 
°
The unsatisfactory growth of Indian agriculture has led to increasing
concern among Indian planners in the late 1950’s. The American Ford Foun-
dation (represented in India by one of its largest overseas missions)
entered the discussion of alternative policy measures with the publication
of its Report on India’s Food Crisis and Steps to Meet I t.51 This report,
prepared after a whirlwind ten-week visit to India by a dozen American
agricultural experts, spoke ominously of an impending food crisis and
recommended major steps to deal with it.52 The influence of the report
was profound. The foundation assigned another team of agricultural I experts
to draft a program of action and the resulting Intensive Agricultural Dis-
tricts Programme (IADP) was adopted by the Indian Government in June 1960.
The principles embodied in the IADP, strongly supported by USAID, informed
Indian agricultural policy throughout the next decade.53
The IADP selected one pilot district in each of the 15 Indian states
which was to be supplied with all 1 of the various agricultural 1 inputs--fer-
tilizers, pesticides, improved seeds, water, credit, marketing facilities,
technical assistance, etc.--necessary to improve significantly agricultural
productivity. Districts were selected from areas already favored by a well-
organized community development bureaucracy, good credit and marketing
facilities, an assured water supply, no major &dquo;farm consolidation problems,&dquo;
and &dquo;readily available local agrarian leadership receptive to change.&dquo;5~ ,
In other words, the new agricultural policy explicitly concentrated scarce
resources in the hands of better-off farmers in favored areas in an all-out
effort to increase output without regard to adverse distributional conse-
quences. Notably absent from the initial Ford Report as well as from the
IADP itself was any concern for land reform or related institutional
changes.
The actual achievement of the IADP in raising output was described in
disappointing terms a decade later by a sympathetic American economist,
Dorris D. Brown, long associated with the Ford Foundation in India: 
°
Only 3 of the 15 IADP districts reported significantly higher . 
’
rates of change in output and yield for foodgrains during the
IADP years (than) during the previous five years. Only 2
IADP districts reported significantly higher changes in out-
puts of foodgrains than did bordering districts.55
Nonetheless, the principles of resource concentration and reliance on the
&dquo;progressive&dquo; (i.e., wealthy) farmer to spearhead agricultural growth were
further promoted in the mid-1960’s by the extension of the IADP concept to
the Intensive Agricultural Areas Programme (IAAP) and the introduction of
a High Yielding Varieties Programme (HYVP) in selected areas with assured
irrigation and rainfall. As described in glowing terms by John P. Lewis,
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Minister-Director of the USAID Mission to India from 1964 to 1969, the new
agricultural strategy: ,
relied for its drive on the Indian cultivator’s appetite for
gain and upon his native intelligence for much of its imple-
mentation...it would take bold steps, despite the heavy drain
on the country’s scarce foreign exchange, radically to in- 
’
crease the importation of fertilizers and provide the new
seed supplies; and follow up forthwith with swift expansion
of (and recruitment of foreign private participation in) do-
mestic production of fertilizer, seeds, pesticides and other
agricultural I inputs. The strategy would rely on the initial 1
success of the seed-fertilizer combination in the hands of
the more alert farmers to create effective pulls on other
such potentially bottle-necking factors as agricultural .
credit t and irrigation.56
Toward the late 1960’s there was evidence that the increased use of
fertilizers and new seeds in the so-called &dquo;Green Revolution&dquo; had con-
tributed to an improvement in the agricultural performance of some crops in
some areas (notably wheat in North India) .5~ However, the extent of such
improvement was in doubt, and it was clear that the benefits of the agri-
cultural gains were distributed very unequally as among different regions
and different classes of people.58 The lion’s share of the gains from the
&dquo;Green Revolution&dquo; have accrued to large land-owners; who have used govern-
ment programs to concentrate land and agricultural resources in their own
hands. These beneficiaries of the new agricultural policy, now commonly
referred to as &dquo;kulak&dquo; farmers, have become an increasingly powerful rural
class that has derived much support.from Western sources in promoting its
economic interests. Meanwhile, the vast majority of the rural population--
small-holding cultivators and agricultural laborers--have scarcely managed
to maintain their standard of living, and many have lost what little rights
to land they initially held.
Oil, Drugs, and Fertilizers .
The oil and chemical industries are often the focus of economic im-
perialism because of the immense power of the major multinational oil and
chemical concerns. This was conspicuously true in India where Western in-
fluence was brought to bear upon the development of the oil, pharmaceutical,
and fertilizer industries. ~It should be noted at the outset that the
Second Industrial Policy Resolution (1956) had classified oil in the first
category of industries in which all new units would be established by the
state while drugs and pharmaceuticals, as well as fertilizers, were classi-
fied in the second category in which new undertakings were to be estab-
lished increasingly by the state.59 ’
The Indian government had attempted initially in the early 1950’s to
set up several public sector drug plants with help from Western firms, but
it proved impossible to negotiate any agreements satisfactory to both
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parties.60 In 1956 a group of Russian experts recommended an integrated
multi-plant industry under state ownership. Soon thereafter, private
Indian and Western interests began to register their opposition to the
Russian suggestion, and they managed to generate an alternative proposal
from within the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry that called for a
private sector drug industry with aid from Western firms. In spite of a
new Russian offer of substantial aid for the public sector project, the
Indian government concluded a major agreement with Merck and Co., Inc., of
the United States for the production of antibiotics, and encouraged other
Western firms to enter the industry with Indian partners. Merck’s produc-
tion costs were nearly twice those envisaged by the Russians, and the cost
to India in royalty payments, service fees and technical secrecy was far
higher than in the Russian proposals. The Indian decision was clearly in-
fluenced by the exercise of Western power. As one American trade-journal
reported it:
Drug officials started looking at India about two years ago,
just as the Russians began a big push to have India freed
from the dependence on Western chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
Soviet engineers, loans, and all else needed would be pro-
vided if the Indians would take USSR help and build the
state-owned industry.
Fortunately for the Free World, Merck and other U.S. and
Western drug and chemical firms have not been idle since.
Merck’s efforts have helped in part to stall this Soviet 
’
offensive...the original Soviet offer.....is shelved, and
the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry will not be a governmentmonopoly.
Since that time, the rapidly growing and highly profitable pharmaceutical
industry has been dominated by foreign firms, whose patent rights and re-
mittances have priced many important medicinal products out of the reach of
the average Indian consumer.
The Indian oil industry was completely dominated through the 1950’s by
the three foreign private oil companies, Burmah-Shell, Esso and Caltex.62
The monopolistic position of these companies has only gradually and incom-
pletely been undermined in the 1960’s by the development of a domestic
public sector capacity for oil extraction, refining, and distribution. The
development of India’s state-run oil operations depended crucially upon
Soviet bloc assistance, and it has gradually improved India’s bargaining
position vis-a-vis the Western oil companies. However, the bargaining is
almost continual, always hard, and often influenced by the power of the
World Bank and its partners in the Aid-India Club.
A decisive point in the conflict between the Indian government and the
oil companies was reached in 1960, when the Soviet Union offered to supply
India with large quantities of crude oil 1 at a price well 1 below that charged
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by the Western-controlled refineries.63 Because a large part of the pro-
fitability of the major oil 1 companies stemmed from the use of their own
crude oil, they adamantly refused to process Soviet oil. The oil companies
did offer to lower the prices charged for their own crude, but the Indian
government remained dissatisfied and there were calls from various quarters 
’
for nationalization of the refineries.
The actual response of the government, however, was necessarily con-
ditioned by India’s economic dependence on the West. At the time of the .
debate over the Soviet offer of crude oil, the Third Five Year Plan was
being prepared and the World Bank was carrying out one of the periodic
assessments of the Indian situation on which it based its recommendations
to the Aid-India Club. The Bank would clearly not stand for the forced
introduction of Soviet crude oil, much less the nationalization of Western
refineries.64 In the event, the Indian Government stopped well short of
nationalization or of any attempt to force the use of Soviet crude. Instead,
it responded by setting up a new Oil Price Enquiry Committee, reasserting
. lamely the priority of state over private refineries, and refusing to allow
the expansion of existing refineries or building of new refineries by the
three Major Western companies. As one close observer put it:
’ 
Western pressure, whether explicit or implicit, undoubtedly
played a major role in the Indian government decision.65
Even this mild response, however, was subsequently moderated. Under pres-
sure from the Aid-India Club, the general scarcity of foreign exchange, and
the steady rise in domestic demand for oil products, the government soon
permitted substantial increases in oil processing by the three major
Western refineries, and it dropped its earlier policy of confining new re-
fineries wholly to the public sector by agreeing to joint state refining
ventures with foreign private firms.66
In spite of significant concessions to Western oil companies over the
years, the development of an Indian national oil industry and the use of
Soviet bloc assistance has freed India from total dependence on foreign
private oil-interests. At present India can meet approximately half of its
oil requirements from domestic sources and the government continues to bar-
gain with Western firms over the other half. During the 1960’s, however,
Indian dependence and Western imperialist influence has become increasingly
evident in the rapidly growing petro-chemical fertilizer industry.
As noted earlier, one of the key elements of the new agricultural po-
licy in India was a massive increase in the supply and use of fertilizers.
At the end of the Second Five Year Plan, Indian fertilizer consumption was
extremely low by comparison with most other countries.67 To step up 
’
. rapidly the supply of fertilizers, the Third Plan aimed at almost a ten-fold
expansion of._domestic production, and--the Industrial Policy Resolution of
1956 notwith~t~nding--the private sector was licensed to provide the major
share of the increased capacity. But Indian businessmen found it difficult
to interest foreign chemical companies--on whose technical assistance they
a
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depended--in joint fertilizer ventures largely because the foreign com-
panies rejected the Indian policy of domestic majority ownership in the .
fertilizer industry. As a result of both public and private sector short-
falls, fertilizer production lagged well behind its targeted level during
the Third Plan, fertilizer imports increased rapidly, and the government
found itself increasingly desperate for a solution to the food and fertili-
zer problem.
Under pressure from all sides, government officials met in 1964 with
executives of major United States corporations interested in foreign in-
vestment in an attempt to improve the Indian investment climate, particu-
larly for fertilizers. Soon thereafter a major proposal for building five
new plants to produce one million tons of fertilizer (close to the actual
target of the Third Plan) was put forward by the Bechtel Corporation.
Negotiations with Bechtel were marked by disagreements over acceptable
rates of return, control of marketing and distribution, and the extent of
ownership and control by the Indian government. Although the government .
had by then agreed in principle to sanction new fertilizer ventures with
majority foreign capital, the Bechtel proposal was ultimately rejected.
But in late 1965 and early 1966, the crisis in India deepened and the
pressure from the West increased. On top of the mounting food problem of
the early 1960’s, India was struck by the worst drought of the century and
in 1966 faced an enormous deficit of foodgrains. At the same time, India
had incurred the displeasure of the United States and a temporary suspen-
sion of Western aid because of her involvement in the Indo-Pakistan War
which broke out in August and September 1965. Under these circumstances
President Johnson, as reported in the New York Times, &dquo;declined to sign a
new year-long Food-for-Peace program, insisting that India must first take
some hard decisions about food policy.&dquo;68 Moreover, &dquo;The United States
government and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
have insisted that India provide easier terms for foreign private invest-
ment in fertilizer plants as one condition of resumed economic aid.&dquo;69
It should come as no surprise that in December 1965, the Indian government
announced a reversal in policy that gave private fertilizer plants full
control over their own pricing and distribution for seven years; and in
May 1966, the government signed a collaboration agreement with the American
International Oil I Company in which management control was to be split 50-50
although the government retained 51% of equity in the joint venture.
Liberalization and Devaluation .
The pressure brought upon Indian fertilizer policy was part of a more
wide-ranging effort by the Western powers to change the whole tenor of
Indian economic policy.70 World Bank Missions to India had long complained
about the extent of government controls over both domestic and foreign
private enterprise. Beginning with the Bell I Mission Report of 1964, in-
creasing pressure was brought to relax these controls, to simplify licensing
procedures, to allow greater freedom in the use of foreign exchange, and--
as a key element and striking symbol of the whole strategy of economic
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&dquo;liberalization&dquo;--to devalue the rupee.
The nature of the pressure applied by the Western powers was blatant
enough to offend almost all segments of Indian opinion and to produce a
vocal, if impotent, nationalist reaction. First of all, most of the Western
aid suspended during the Indo-Pakistan war was not resumed until April 1966--
long after the fighting had ceased. Secondly, President’Johnson held up
PL 480 shipments and eventually authorized them only on a month-to-month
basis under near-famine conditions. Finally, the World Bank made it un-
mistakably clear that future consortium aid was contigent upon economic
liberalization and the devaluation of the rupee.71
The inevitable outcome was announced in early June 1966, when the
Indian government devalued the rupee from 4.75 to 7.50 rupees per dollar
and simultaneously liberalized its import licensing policies. The economic
impact of these measures is a matter of some controversy. There can be no
doubt that economic conditions in India failed to improve, but this failure
is sometimes attributed to exogenous factors such as the second successive
year of drought in 1966-67.72 Nonetheless, the World Bank, on behalf of its
consortium partners, continued in subsequent years to promote policies of
liberalization and to &dquo;load its advice with the promise of aid.&dquo;73 As
explained in a New York Times dispatch (under the significant heading:
&dquo;Drift from Socialism to Pragmatism&dquo;):
Much of what is happening now is the result of steady pressure
from the United States and the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, which for the last year have been
urging a substantial freeing of the Indian economy and a
greater scope for private enterprise. _
The United States pressure, in particular, has been highly
effective here because the United States provides by far the
largest part of the foreign exchange needed to finance India’s
development and keep the wheels of industry turning.
Call them ’strings,’ call them ’conditions,’ or whatever one
likes, India has little choice now but to agree to many of the
terms that the United States, through the World Bank, is
putting on its aid. For India simply has nowhere else to turn.74
IV. The Political Economy of Indian Development
The pattern of economic development in India since independence poses
a number of important questions. Why did Nehru’s conception of a self-
reliant &dquo;socialist&dquo; development strategy not prevail? Why did India turn
to the West to bail out the economy in the late 1950’s, rather than impose
a domestic austerity program, or seek greater assistance from social ist
countries? Why was the government unable or unwilling to bring about sig-
nificant agrarian reform, and why did it turn instead to an agrarian
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strategy based on strengthening the rich farmer? To answer such questions,
one must examine the class structure of independent India as it emerged
from the history of British colonial rule and the nationalist movement.75
Two centures of British hegemony on the sub-continent had a significant
impact on the traditional pattern of social stratification based upon the
hierarchical Hindu caste system. The introduction of new propetty rights
and new forms of taxation, as well as an increasingly rapid growth of pop-
ulation, led to an increasingly economic stratification of agrarian society.
At the apex of a multi-layered pyrami was an elite group of native princes,
absentee landlords and money-lenders who owed their comfortable position
entirely to the British, with whom they jointly maintained order in the
countryside. Below this parasitic elite were many intermediate layers of
cultivators with varying rights to land, ranging from a very small percen-
tage of farmers with large holdings to a mass of peasants with some (usually
tenuous) claim to a plot of land barely sufficient to provide for one
family. At the bottom, representing roughly a quarter of the rural popula-
tion, was a class of landless and of.ten serf-like agricultural laborers.
This structure of economic classes was correlated with, but not identical
to, the traditional caste hierarchy. 
’°
In contrast to the pre-capitalist’relations of production that charac-
terized almost all of Indian agriculture, a limited amount of modern
capitalist industry had emerged under British rule. Although the colonial
government consistently favored British capital, an indigenous Indian
capitalist class began to develop slowly in the second half of the 19th
century from among earlier trading classes which had collaborated with the
British. Because of the obstacles faced by Indian capital, the indigenous
capitalist class remained highly concentrated among particular families and
regions of India. Furthermore, its relations with-British capital were
highly ambivalent; the Indians generally depended upon the British for
technical and managerial assistance, but they became increasingly competi-
tive with the British in marketing their output. In the last decades of &dquo;
British rule Indian capitalists gained financial control of an increasing
number of industries formerly dominated by the British, and by the begin-
ning of the Second World War they had become a wealthy and powerful
national bourgeoisie. 
°
With the growth of modern industry and related services (e.g., rail-
ways and communication) India developed an organized industrial working
class. Because of the limited spread of industry, however, it represented
only a small fraction of non-agricultural workers. A larger number of wage-
earners were employed as white-collar workers in government services.
Together, these blue-collar and white-collar workers constituted a rela-
tively privileged labor aristocracy. The great majority of the non-
agricultural workinq force belonged neither to the capitalist nor to the
organized working class. Instead, they were either self-employed persons
in services and household industry or part of the unorganized lumpen-
proletariat irregularly employed by small enterprises of one kind or
another. -
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Finally, a very important class to emerge from the British colonial
period was the elite, highly educated class of professionals and admin-
istrators. Like the Indian capitalist class, its relations with the British
were highly ambivalent. As recipients of an English education, they were
very much oriented to Western culture and very much at home with their
British counterparts. On the other hand, in spite of the British policy of
gradual &dquo;Indianization&dquo; of public administration, they grew more and more
resentful of their subordinate status in the colonial hierarchy.
The Indian nationalist movement had its origins in a moderate group of
professionals--both English and Indian--who formed the Indian National
Congress in 1885 to press for reforms that would improve the position of
the Indian upper class within the framework of continued British rule.
Leading Indian capitalists soon supported and participated in the organiza-
tion as their interest in promoting Indian industry coalesced with the aims
of the Indian intelligentsia. But only after the First World War, when the
nationalists began to press seriously for independence from British rule,
did the Congress become a mass movement. By the Second World War the
Congress had gained support among the urban middle and lower classes as well
as many strata of the peasantry. Although the most downtrodden and the
most isolated g.roups were largely unaware of or indifferent to the Congress,
only a few groups that were very closely linked to the British (e.g.,
native princes, large absentee landlords, and a few members of the urban
upper class) actually opposed independence.
From the point of view of subsequent developments, the most important
aspects of the nationalist movement were (1) that the Indian bourgeoisie
and intelligentsia remained in firm command of the struggle for indepen-
dence and (2) that the attainment of .independence involved no revolutionary
social upheaval, but simply a transfer of power from the retreating colo-
nial rulers to the dominant Indian classes. Indian independence left the
indigenous class structure and distribution of political and economic power
basically unchanged, with the exception of the few pro-British groups who
lost some of their power and privilege.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze why the nation-
alist movement did not become a revolutionary one, a few points may be
mentioned. First of all, the British colonial rulers did not completely
repress the development of modern elites in India. Rather, they permitted
and to some extent fostered the growth of an Indian bourgeoisie and intel-
ligentsia that were quite Westernized and hence not implacably hostile to
their colonial rulers. This elite proved powerful enough to dominate
other indigenous classes. Secondly, a number of potentially more revolu-
tionary groups in India were won over to the Congress movement by the per-
sonal appeal of leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru.
Gandhi obtained mass support among the peasantry with his commitment to the
ideals of the Indian village and his promotion of certain aspects of Hindu
religious philosophy. At the same time, Nehru gained support among left-
oriented workers and youth by raising the banner of socialism in India.
Neither Gandhi norNehru, however, posed any real threat to the conservative
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tenets of the national bourgeoisie whose financial backing was essential
to the Congress. On numerous occasions during the history of the national-
lst movement, Gandhi and Nehru backed away from radical measures and aligned
themselves with the less visible but no less powerful conservative forces
1 n the movement.
A lack of alternative leadership and organization, and the continual
vacillation of the Moscow-dependent Communist Party of India, prevented any
effective challenge to the Congress from the left. Only the religious di-
vision between Hindus and Moslems placed a limit on the authority of the
Congress leadership, as they were eventually forced to yield the territory
of Pakistan to the rival Muslim League. Finally, the fact that the British
rulers were ultimately ready to negotiate compromise settlements with the
Indian nationalist movement, rather than force the issue to a more violent
plane, facilitated a relatively peaceful and non-revolutionary transfer of
power. 
The Congress Party that took power in independent India was controlled
by a narrow elite of businessmen and professionals which enjoyed widespread
support from other classes. The Western orientation of the new leadership,
and the natural desire of dominant classes to limit the threat of radical
upheavals, contributed to the establishment in India of a framework of par-
liamentary democracy in which persuasion rather than coercion was expected
to bring about social and economic change. In the absence of any social
and economic revolution, this framework served in fact to maintain an ex-
tremely inegalitarian class structure as the stronger classes fairly easily
dominated the weaker classes in the political arena.
The strongest urban class was clearly the big-bourgeoisie, with sub-
stantial financial power. To some extent the highly educated professionals
exercised independent power through their control of government administra-
tion, but their strength ultimately depended on political support from out-
side the government. The most important new development in the class
structure was the emergence of a new landed elite in the rural areas. The
old elite of princes and large absentee landowners was discredited by its
association with the British and became early victims of Congress legisla-
tion. In its stead rose the next layer of agrarian society, the relatively
wealthy large land-holding farmers who dominated the villages. Their
ability to deliver the rural vote (which constitutes 80% of the total) gave
them a strong base of political power. _
Against this background, it becomes clear that socialism in any
meaningful form was out of the question for India in the period following
independence. The political base of Congress Party rule precluded serious
challenges to the sanctity of private property. The exiqcncics of electoral
politics did demand, however, that the Congress Party raise the banner of
social and economic change as well as that of nationalism. To this end
the rhetoric of a &dquo;socialistic pattern of society&dquo; as well as &dquo;self-reliant
development,&dquo; as propounded by Jawaharlal Nehru, proved very useful.
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Hcwever, the effort to carry out self-reliant development in India
appears in retrospect to have been doomed by the basically capitalist eco-
nomic framework to which the Indian leadership was committed. To achieve
self-reliant development in India, it t would be necessary (1) to mobilize
sufficient financial resources from domestic sources to finance massive .
development expenditures; (2) to shape the structure of the economy in such
a way as to limit t the demand for foreign goods and services; and (3) to .
mobilize the full productive potential of the rural population so as to
make constructive use of the vast reservoir of idle and under-utilized .
labor. The history of Indian economic policy-making since independence
brings out t clearly how the capitalist t framework of the economy--and the
class structure upon which it t was based--inhibited the achievement of any
of the above measures essential to self-reliant development.
In the two decades since the inauguration of economic planning in India,
the rate of net domestic savings as a proportion of net national income has
rarely exceeded 1 G~6. ~6 Why were higher rates of saving not achieved? I n
part this was due to the continual 1 difficulty of raising taxes from the
powerful upper-income groups who control a substantial share of the taxable
surplus. To this day there is almost t no taxation of agricultural 1 income in
India, even though it is recognized that great fortunes have been made by
large land-holding farmers. Whi le wages and salary earners cannot escape
the incomes tax net, much business and professional income goes undeclared
and untaxed. incentives for private saving have been limited by the opera-
tion of a consumption &dquo;demonstration effect&dquo; propagated by the opulent t
standard of living of foreigners and many indigenous elites. In the con-
text of limited private saving and limited public ability to raise tax
revenues, the government soon found it much easier to seek foreign finan-
cial resources than to take serious sfeps against domestic surplus-holding
classes in order to promote development.77
The failure of Indian economic decision-makers to limit effectively 
’
the demand for foreign goods and services is closely related to the failure
to raise adequate domestic savings. For the limitation of such demand would
require curtailing the purchasing power of the richer classes whose expen-
diture involves goods and services with a relatively high foreign input
content.78 But the political and economic power of the rich has prevented
sufficiently stringent control of their luxury expenditure and thereby con-
tributed to the so-called &dquo;foreign exchange problem.&dquo;
Finally, the economic history of independent India points to an enor-
mously costly failure to mobilize the full I productive potential of the .
rural population. On the one hand, much uf the cultivating pcpulation has
too swall or too uncertain a stake iii Jand to be nwtivated to work
eff iciently; thus llhe spread of modern farn:irg techniques has been limited
to the wealthier I aiid-tiol cler s. 79 On the other hand, in spite of much talk
about the desirability of employing idle labor on large-scale rural de-
velopment works, such programs have in fact been extremely limited in scope.80
The attainment of equity and cooperation in rural areas has been blocked by
the power and influence of large land-holding farmers, who have prevented
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the implementation of most of the land reform bills enacted by various
state legislatures.81 Large-scale labor-intensive public works programs ’
have run up against the obstacles of inadequate resource mobilization and
a lack of collective spirit, both of which were due in considerable part to
the persistence of a grossly inegalitarian rural society. After the fail-
ure of initial efforts to bring about agricultural improvement on a new
foundation of equity and cooperation, the government--with a strong push
from the Western capitalist powers--turned instead to a strategy of
&dquo;kulakization&dquo; involving heavy foreign involvement in the supply of chem-
ical fertilizers, tractors, etc.
In sum, the political economic base that characterized India at inde-
pendence offered a choice between virtual economic stagnation or an in-
complete, inegalitarian and dependent form of economic growth. The 
.
government recognized this partially in its early moves to attract foreign
private capital and came to understand it fully in its later drive for
foreign aid. Indian business leaders, at first distrustful of foreign com-
petition, soon came to realize that their own interests would be served far
better by collaboration with foreign firms in industrial ventures than by
the more difficult effort to develop indigenous technological capability.
Given this logic of dependent growth, it made sense for the government and
for private capital to seek help wherever they could find it. But it re-
mains to be explained why India became so heavily dependent on the Western
capitalist powers and did not at least balance its dependence between East
and West so as to improve its bargaining position.
In the first place, it should be noted that some 5-10% of the total
aid received by India has con~e from the socialist countries.82 This aid
has helped India to set up some important public sector projects, and in
some cases (notably the oil 1 industry) it has enabled the government to
bargain for better terms from Western firms. Yet on the whole the flow of
financial aid and other forms of assistance from the East has been too
small to reduce significantly India’s dependence on the West.
The major reason for India’s Western orientation appears to be the pre-
dominance of Western-oriented class forces within India. Both the urban
bourgeoisie and the urban intelligentsia are culturally inclined to t’he
West. More important, the basic economic interests of the Indian proper-
tied classes--both in urban and rural areas--are much closer to those of
Western capitalists than Soviet officials. While differences may well I
arise over issues such as tariff protection and import restrictions, the
Indian propertied classes share with their Western counterparts a common
stake in the sanctity of private property and related rules of the capital-
ist game. The only significant force in India operating to promote closer
relations with Soviet bloc countries is the desire of the government
bureaucracy to extend state control over economic activity. The history of
Indian economic policy demonstrates clearly, however, that t the government t
bureaucracy does not have the power to inyose its will on private groups
when the interests of the two come into serious conflict.
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In sum, India’s economic dependence on the Western capitalist powers
has arisen as the natural 1 consequence of the c lass structure that charac-
terized India at the time of independence. The class basis of the dominant
Congress Party led to a commitment by the leadership to a fundamentally .
capitalist path of development., which in turn precluded a self-reliant
strategy and led inexorably to dependence on Western capital. Moreover,
once such channels of dependence are established they tend to become self-
perpetuating. As the links between Indian and Western interests (both in
the private and the public sector) grow stronger, there is a corresponding
growth in the number and significance of those Indians with a stake in
continued links to the West. Thus the domestic balance of power in India
has shifted more strongly in favor of those classes--e.g., urban capital-
ists and rural &dquo;kulaks&dquo;--who share the desire of the Western capitalist
powers to promote a path of dependent capitalist growth.
V. Conclusions . 
’
. The main conclusion to be drawn from the experience of independent
India is that, in the absence of a revolutionary transformation of the
domestic class structure, an ex-colonial underdeveloped country faces a
choice between economic stagnation or economic dependence on the major
capitalist powers. The latter course opens the country to Western im-
perialist influence, which in turn reinforces the dependency relationship
by strengthening those domestic classes most interested in a Western-
oriented capitalist path of economic growth. Thus, dependence and imperial-
ism are closely woven together in the fabric of international 1 capitalism.
~ 
That the economic growth of underdeveloped countries such as India is
predicated upon close links with the major capitalist powers is a proposi-
tion that will be widely accepted. However, the negative judgment suggested
by the use of terms such as &dquo;dependence&dquo; and &dquo;imperialism&dquo; will be just as
widely disputed. Most Western observers--social scientists, public
officials, and private businessmen--view the integration of the Indian eco-
nomy into the world capitalist system as highly beneficial to all I parties
concerned. They reject the notion that the advice, the influence and the
exercise of power associated with Western public and private capital in
India represents any form of economic imperialism. It seems appropriate,
therefore, to conclude this essay by sumn~arizing the grounds for critique
of the Western economic role in India.
In the first place, Western influence on economic policy in India is
objectionable because it involves the arrogation of considerable decision-
making power by foreigners who have no claim to represent the Indian people.
The very process by which foreigners influence national policy tends to
. impugn national integrity and to undermine the dignity and morale of the
indigenous population. This objection applies no matter how the decision-
making power is actually used by foreigners, whether it is ostensibly for
&dquo;the peop-le 45 own good&dquo; or not. What is at stake is the principle of self-
determination, the right of people to participate in and control the
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decisions that t affect their own lives.
The above objection might be set aside, however, if it could be argued
that the policies encouraged by Western influence were in fact beneficial
to the Indian people. The most important objection to the Western role in
I nd i a is rooted in a critique of the overall 1 strategy of econorn i c growth
promoted by the Western powers and their Indian allies. The strategy calls
for a basically capitalist economy, closely linked through trade and in-
vestment with the world capitalist system; it relies on domestic and for-
eign private enterprise, aided by sympathetic public agencies, to bring
about economic growth. This strategy must be condemned both for the in-
adequacy of the rate of growth that it yields and for the character of the
economic and social conditions that it fosters.
From 1948-49 through 1969-70 the average annual 1 rate of growth of real 1
-national product in India was approximately 3.3%8 and the corresponding rate
of growth of per capita income was just over 1%.f3 The rates of growth
were actually lower in the 1960’s than in the 1950’s. While this perfor-
mance represents an improvement upon the economic stagnation that charac-
terized the colonial period, it falls far short of the objectives of the
I ~’j I an leadership as well I as the aspirations and needs of f the Indian I
people.
Many of the obst~c1e~ to more rapid economic growth in India stem from
the capitalist framework of development.84 The strength of private upper
income groups in India has limited.! the ability of the government to finance
its development plans, and the propensity of the rich to consume luxury
goods has limited their own private saving. The inconsistency of appeals
to collective social I effort t with the dominant capitalist t ethos has con-
tributed to the widely recognized failure to mobilize idle labor. And many
institutional changes that could motivate a much greater application of
human resources to production (e.g., land reform) have been inhibited by
powerful propertied interests. The foreign aid received by India since in-
dependence has scarcely compensated for such obstacles. At its peak, the
net inflow of foreign capital averaged little more than 3% of India’s
national product.85 With a rapidly mounting burden of foreign debt repay-
ment cutting into a steadily diminishing supply of new aid from foreign
donor countries, it t has become clcar that India cannot expect the inflow of
foreign resources to make up for the grossly inadequate level of domestic
resource mobilization.86 
.
But even if such obstacles to economic growth are somehow overcome,
what kind of growth does capitalism offer a country like India? Many of .
its characteristics are visibly associated willi tie I iini Led growth that
liars occurred since independence, lilt tlic first t placc, it l is ~ r u w t h that is
based upon steadily B.¡idl’lIil1q illequ.11 i ties of income oriil wealth. Rc 1 i ancc
on urban capitalists (domestic tlnd foreign) and oo knlak termers to bring
about growth CJI1 only succeed to tie extent that those jjruuj>s are rewarded 
°
with high income and consumption levels. Most of the economic gains that
India has realized in the past two decades have been enjoyed by a limited
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set of middle- and upper-income classes.87 
~
, 
Secondly, the capitalist strategy of growth does not provide adequate
employment opportunities in a labor-surplus economy. The purchasing power
of the rich, and the influence of foreign practice on the choice of produc-
tion techniques, tend to generate excessive demands for such scarce re-
sources as capital, skilled labor and foreign exchange, and insufficient
demand for unskilled labor.88 Moreover, a capitalist government is typic-
ally incapable of putting idle labor to work. During two decades of planned
development in India, the problems of under-employment and unemployment
appear to have grown steadily worse.89
Finally, capitalist growth brings many of the undesirable qualities
that characterize the rich capitalist societies in the contemporary world.
Human values such as community, spirituality and brotherhood are undermined
by the competitive logic of the market. Traditional forms of security are
replaced not by new social arrangements catering to the same basic needs,
but t by increasing insecurity and alienation. Cultural life is continually
threatened by homogenization to the lowest world-wide common denominator,
gradually losing its distinctive indigenous character under the onslaught
of Coca Cola bottles and James Bond films. There are already numerous
signs of such changes in India, even though capitalism has not yet fully
penetrated the country.
. In sum, the most fundamental criticism of the Western role in indepen-
dent India-is that it helps to promote an internationally-oriented capital-
ist development strategy whose long-run consequences for the great majority




. In recent years events have taken place in India that may suggest a
departure from the syndrome of dependence and imperialism described in this
essay. Successive years of poor rainfall and bad harvests from 1965 to
1967, the humiliating episode of devaluation in 1966, a three-year postpone-
ment of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (originally schduled to start in April,
1966), and generally deteriorating economic conditions had contributed to
an atmosphere of growling unrest in the late 1960’s. The ruling Congress
Party was increasingly attacked for its failure to achieve self-reliant
growth and a &dquo;socialistic pattern of society.&dquo; In effect, India’s capital-
ist t framework of development t was being ci~a 1 1 e_nged, and’the Congress Party
had to move to meet the challenge. _
First of all, the Congress leadership began to adopt a more nationalis-
tic stance on economic questions. The virtues of self-reliance, which
seemed to have been gati~ering dust during the previous decade, were once
again brought out and extolled at public forums. Since aid prospects were
in any event t becoming increasingly glouniy--becausc of dimning entfiusiasm on
the part of the major donors (especially the United States) and the mounting
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burden of debt service on past loans--the new posture may largely have
reflected the making of a virtue out of neccs5 i ty. But government spokes-
men did seek to align themselves with the critics of aid dependence.
Secondly, Mrs. Gandhi sought to project her Government as the champion
of the poor by initiating a series of measures designed to display its
socialist bona fides. These measures included the nationalization of
India’s 14 largest private comncrcial banks in July, 1969; the subsequent
firing of a Finance Minister (Morarji Desai) long identified with the con-
servative wing of the Congress Party; a continuing effort to strip the
former rulers of princely states of some remaining special privileges; and,
most recently, the promotion of legislation aimed at facilitating state
acquisition and redistribution of private property with ample discretion
over the amount of compensation due.90 This apparent lunge to the left
provoked an intra-party dispute within the Congress that led ultimately to
its formal split into two distinct parties, with a substantial majority of
the old party members adhering to Mrs. Gandhi’s ruling &dquo;new Congress&dquo;
party. Riding a new wave of popularity, but suffering from a slight
minority position in the national assembly, Mrs. Gandhi abruptly called a
new general election in March, 1971, and emerged with a stunning victory
over all the opposition parties.91
The events in Bangladesh in the following year helped to reinforce the
new trends. With the Soviet Union emerging as India’s major political ally
(although still 1 a minor contributor of economic aid) and the United States
becoming one of India’s major political enemies, pro-Western forces in
India suffered a serious setback. When the United States suspended part of
its aid to India, the rhetoric of self-reliance became all the more insis-
tent. The Moscow-oriented Communist Party of India was welcomed by Mrs.
Gandhi i into domestic electoral I alliances, and her Congress Party gained
further strength on the Left. Finally, in the elections to state assem-
blies in March, 1972, Mrs. Gandhi i rode the crest t of f her populari ty for the
liberation of Bangladesh to further electoral triumphs.92 More than at
any time since the mid-1950’s, India seemed poised to launch a genuinely
new economic policy.
In many ways, the current situation resembles that of the mid-19~o’s:
a popular leader committed to socialism and sclf-reliance; warm political
relations with the Soviet Union and coolness towards the United States; and
a domestic class structure dominated by strong propertied classes. But ,
Mrs. Gandhi in the 1970’s appears to be more strongly committed to change
than was Nehru in the 1950’s, and less inclined to compromise with opposing
interests. The prospects of aid from the Western powers are not as good as
they were in the 1950’s, although foreign private capital is probably more
enthusiastic than before. And the I nd i an masses are no doubt much more
politicized than they were in the early 1950’s, more aware of their needs,
and more capable of pre s 5 i n g their demands. All I of f these points suggest t a
greater likelihood that the ruling Congress Party will bring about signi-
ficant change now than in the past.
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However, in one important respect the present situation poses a much
stronger barrier to evolutionary change than was true in the past. The
capitalist pattern of development that has characterized India during the
last two decades has greatly strengthened those classes most committed to
a Western-oriented capitalist strategy. The Indian urban bourgeoisie, the
rural kulak farmers, as well as foreign investors and collaborators, aren
all much more firmly and powerfully entrenched in Indian society than they
were two decades ago. It seems probable, therefore, that only a revolu-
tionary redistribution of power--of a kind that has never taken place in
modern India and is certainly not on the agenda of Mrs. Gandhi’s government--
could usher in a genuinely new pattern of economic development.
Department of Economics; University of Michigan; Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104.
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NOTES*
1These figures are drawn from Table 28, p. 106, and Table 5, p. 23,
of FRNIC (1954).
2This estimate is based on calculations made by the author using data
on the total assets of foreign branches and foreign-controlled rupee com-
panies in IFLA (1950) and IFLA (1955), and data on the total assets of all
public and private limited joint stock companies in FSJSCI (1967).
Mazumdar (1959) arrives at a similar figure in Table 9, pp. 72-3.
3This term has figured prominently in statements by Congress leaders,
and it was declared to be an official policy objective in a resolution
passed by the Congress Party in its session at Avadi in 1955. See the
Indian National Congress (1969), pp. 86-9.
4For a detailed analysis of the state of the Indian economy at inde-
pendence, see Bettelheim (1968), Part I.
5The economic policies favored by the ruling Congress Party were set
out in numerous documents published both before and after independence. A
particularly comprehensive (and ambitious) presentation of these policies
is contained in the statement on "Objectives and Economic Programme,"
issued by the All-India Congress Committee in November 1947. See the Indian
National Congress (1969), pp. 18-32.
6For a summary of the views of Indian businessmen on the economic role
of the state, see Kidron (1965), pp. 72-4. Kidron quotes a business weekly
to the following effect: "The real choice before the country is not between
Government versus private enterprise but it is between Government-cum-
British enterprise versus Government-cum-Indian enterprise."
7As Kidron expressed it, "the Congress Government entered Independence
confident that its existence was alone sufficient to release the springs
of economic growth. Pre-independence thinking in both business and politi-
cal circles was agreed on this." See Kidron, p. 97, and also pp. 71-2.
8For documentation on this paragraph, see Kidron (1965), pp. 74-97.
9The pattern of foreign private investment in 1948 is shown in Table 5.
10For documentation on this paragraph, see Kidron (1965), pp. 97-102;
the quotation is from p. 102. 
*Abbreviated references refer to statistical sources identified at the
end of the list of bibliographical references.
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11See Eldridge (1969), pp. 118-19.
12See Eldridge (1969), pp. 29-31.
13For a detailed description of the First Five Year Plan, see Hanson
(1966), Chapter 4.
14See Kidron (1965), pp. 113-16 and 128-30.
15This and the following paragraph draw heavily on the thorough analy-
sis of India’s Second Five Year Plan in Hanson (1966), Chapter 3.
16Quoted in Hanson (1966), p. 126.
17See Hanson (1966), Table 7, p. 134; and Kidron (1965), p. 136.
18For details, see Hanson (1966), pp. 460-62. 
19See Government of India, Ministry of Finance (1955).
20Hanson (1966), p. 132.
21This was the verdict reached by the McKitterick Mission of the World
Bank in its report released in August, 1956; see Hanson (1966), p. 152.
22Quoted in Kidron (1965), p. 154.
23The figures cited in this paragraph are drawn from Table 1.
24The points made in this paragraph are suggested by Kidron (1965),
pp. 123-27.
25The figures cited in this paragraph are drawn from Table 2.
26Although the financial outlay was to be reduced from an initial
level of Rs. 48 billion only to Rs. 45 billion, the real value of the new
figure was much lower because of the inflation that had occurred in the
first few years of the plan. See Kidron (1965), pp. 126, 141.
27This paragraph is based on the account given in Kidron (1965),
pp. 156-59.
28Quoted in Kidron (1965), pp. 157-58.
29Quoted in Kidron (1965), pp. 158.
30This pro-India lobby "was spearheaded by such personalities as the
former ambassadors Bowles and Cooper, Professor J.K. Galbraith...and
Senators Kennedy, Kefauver, Humphrey, Mansfield, and Fulbright;" see
Eldridge (1969), p. 32.
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31The figures cited in the paragraph are drawn from Table 3.
32The figures are given in Kidron (1965), p. 259 and pp. 274-75.
33See Table 4. The value of long-term foreign investment assets
should be distinguished from the value of the total assets controlled by
foreigners. The former includes some foreign investment in Indian-con-
trolled companies; while the latter includes a substantial amount of Indian
investment in foreign-controlled companies.
34According to ES (1971), Table 1.5, agricultural acreage increased by
21.2% and yield per acre by 17.5% between 1950-51 and 1960-61.
35These figures for the two Plan periods are given in Eldridge (1969),
Table 33, p. 112; the figure for 1960 is from ES (1971), Table 1.9.
36See Eldridge (1969), Chapter 6, for a concise discussion of American
aid to India under the PL 480 program.
37See Table 3.
38Eldridge (1969), pp. 112-13.
39The Third Five Year Plan is analyzed in Hanson (1966), Chapter 6..
The figures on anticipated Third Plan expenditures cited in this paragraph
were drawn from Table 15, p. 204, and Table 17, p. 206, in Hanson (1966);
rupee values have been converted into dollars at the official exchange rate
of 4.75 rupees per dollar. 
40The figures on anticipated Third Plan revenues cited in this para-
graph were drawn from Table 20, p. 212, in Hanson (1966); rupee values
have again been converted into dollars at the official exchange rate. 
41Hanson (1966), p. 194.
Ibid.
43The figures on foreign aid cited in this paragraph are drawn from
Table 3.
44The figures are given in Eldridge (1969), Table 33, p. 112.
45See Table 4.
46The structure of foreign investment in India in 1948, 1955, and 1966
is shown in Table 5.
47This estimate is based on calculations made by the author using data
on the total assets of foreign branches, foreign rupee-controlled companies,
public and private limited joint stock companies from annual articles in the
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Reserve Bank of India Bulletin monthly (Bombay) on the finances of a large
sample of these types of company.
48Foreign-controlled companies are defined precisely but arbitrarily 
by the Reserve Bank of India as all subsidiaries of foreign companies "40%
or more of whose shares are owned abroad in any o e country, or 25% or more
of whose shares are owned by a foreign or foreign controlled joint stock
company, or which are managed by foreign controlled managing agents;" see
IFLA (1964) (1964), pp. 25-26.
49See FCII (1968), Table 1.
50For a discussion of the increasing significance of technical col-
laboration agreements as a mechanism of foreign control, see Alavi (1966).
51The Ford-sponsored report was published by the Ministry of Food and
Agriculture and Ministry of Community Development and Cooperation of the
Government of India; see Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agricul-
ture and Ministry of Community Development and Cooperation (1959).
52For a penetrating critique of the Ford report on the food crisis, see
Thorner (1962).
53For an enthusiastic account of the new agricultural strategy by the
head of the USAID mission to India from 1964 to 1969, see Lewis (1970),
pp. 1212-15.
54The quotations are from p. 13 of Brown (1971), who provides a good
descriptive account of the IADP.
55Brown (1971), p. 59. Brown goes on to note that cultivators in
IADP districts fared somewhat better with cash crops than with food crops,
but that this had little to do with the IADP program itself.
56Lewis (1969), pp. 1212-13.
57From 1965-66 to 1970-71 , the official index numbers of overall 
agricultural output as well as yield per acre recorded impressive gains
(see the Indian Eastern Economist, Annual Number 1972, p. 1240, and 1243).
But 1965-66 was an exceptionally bad year due to drought conditions. T.N.
Srinivasan (1971) has compared trend rates of growth for the periods 1949-
50 to 1964-65 and 1949-40 to 1969-70; he concludes that only in wheat has
there been any dramatic improvement in the late 1960’s, while in some crops
there has been relative deterioration.
58For evidence on the distributional impact of recent agricultural
growth in India, see Ladejinsky (1970), and Frankel (1971).
59See Hanson (1966), pp. 461-62.
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60The account in this paragraph is a sunmary of the information pre-
sented in Kidron (1965), pp. 163-65.
61Quoted in Kidron (1965), pp. 164-65.
62 The following paragraphs are based on descriptive accounts of the
development of the Indian oil industry in Eldridge (1969), Chapter 7,
Kidron (1965), pp. 166-75, and Tanzer (1969), Chapters 13-18.
63This offer was almost simultaneous with the Soviet offer to supply
crude oil to Cuba, which led ultimately to the nationalization of the 
Western oil companies by Fidel Castro’s government. On the striking con-
trast between the behavior of the Cuban and Indian governments, see Tanzer
(1969), pp. 344-49.
64See Tanzer (1969), p. 189.
65Ibid., p. 192.
66See Kidron (1965), pp. 172-75.
67The account in the following paragraphs relies heavily on the des-
cription of the development of the Indian fertilizer industry in Tanzer
(1969), Chapter 19.
68From the New York Times, December 18, 1965, quoted in Tanzer (1969),
p. 254.
69From the New York Times, May 15, 1966, quoted in Tanzer (1969), p.
254.
70For a well-documented account of Western aid policy in the 1960’s,
see Eldridge (1969), pp. 34-36.
71According to two very well-informed Indian economists specializing
in international economic relations, "That the (devaluation) measure was
adopted under heavy pressure from this source (the World Bank) is indis-
putable" ; see Bhagwati and Desai (1970), p. 487.
72Bhagwati and Desai (1970), Chapter 22, argue that the drought, the
associated industrial recession, and the lack of enthusiasm with which the
government pursued the new strategy of economic liberalism obscured the 
beneficial effects of the policy. This argument has been strongly contested
by other Indian economists (e.g., N.K. Chandra) who view the new policy as
ineffective at best and harmful at worst.
73In the words of an editorial in the Economic and Political Weekly
of Bombay, April 8, 1967; see also other editorials in a similar vein on
the subject of aid in the issues of November 19, 1966, May 6, 1967, and
July 8, 1967.
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74From the New York Times, April 28, 1966, quoted in Tanzer (1969),
p. 255.
75The historical account that follows is based upon a variety of
sources on Indian social, political, and economic history, particularly
Moore (1966), Chapter 6; Clairmonte (1960), Chapter 2; Brecher (1959);
Desai (1959), Pavlov (1964); Sen (1962); and Sinha (1965).
76See Table 6.
77For a similar analysis of the difficulty of mobilizing domestic
resources in contemporary India, see Chakravarty (1970).
78Hazari (1967) has demonstrated statistically that the goods and ser-
vices purchased by the upper classes in India have on the average a sig-
nificantly higher foreign exchange content than the goods and services pur-
chased by the lower classes.
79See, for example, Frankel (1971).
80See Dandekar and Rath (1971), Part VII, for an instructive discussion
of the failure of the Indian plans to provide adequate rural employment
opportunities.
81The failure of Indian land reform legislation is described and
analyzed in Dandekar and Rath (1971), Part V.
82See Tables 3 and 7.
83Data on the annual level of per capita income in India from 1948-49
through 1969-70 are given in ES (1971), Tables 1 and 2; the growth rates
cited in this paragraph were computed from this source.
84For a more thorough discussion of the limitations of a capitalist
strategy of growth in modern underdeveloped countries, see Weisskopf (1972).
85See Table 6. 
86The net aid (gross aid minus debt service) utilized by India
declined steadily in the late 1960’s and by 1969-70 had fallen to less than
half of its level in the mid-1960’s; see Table 7.
87For evidence on the worsening distribution of real income in in-
dependent India, see Mukherjee and ehatterjee (1967) and Dandekar and Rath
(1971), Part I, Section II.
88This argument is elaborated in Weisskoff (1972).
89For statistical evidence on the worsening employment situation in
India, see the note on "Growth of Employment: 1950-51 to 1968-69," in the
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Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, December 1969, pp. 1909-14.
90The first -three measures are described in Lewis (1970), pp. 1211-12.
The new legislation on which Mrs. Gandhi’s government initiated action in
the summer of 1971 involves four parliamentary bills, labelled collectively
the "socialist package." These bills seek to "restore Parliament’s author-
ity to change the fundamental rights (affirmed in the Indian constitution),
do away with the concept of market-value compensation for acquired property,
and abol ish privy purses and privilege of Princes and ICS (the pre-indepen-
dence Indian Civil Service) officers." See the Statesman (overseas) Weekly,
July 24, 1971.
91After the split of the Congress Party in 1969, Mrs. Gandhi’s faction
held only 220 of the 522 seats in the Lok Sabha (national assembly). In
the national election of 1971, Mrs. Gandhi’s "ruling Congress" Party won
350 seats. The complete election results are reported in Link weekly,
March 14, 1971. 
92For a report on these elections, see the Statesman (overseas) Weekly,
March 18, 1972. 
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aAt the end of the period.
bThe trade figures are annual averages for the period.
CThe Indian fiscal year was from April I I to March 31.
Sources: Imports, exports and trade balance: IBP (1963), Table 1*;
~
BSR I E (1969), Table 5 5 ~~ ; ES ( 1971 ) , Table 6.3.
Foreign exchange reserves: ES (1971), Table 6.1.
*Rupee values converted to dollars at the official 1 exchange rate.
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aConsol idated figures for central and state governments.
bAll figures represent annual averages for the period.
CThe Indian fiscal year runs from April 1 I to March 31..
_Sources: Rupee values for all 1 items were obtained from BSRIE ( 1961 ).,
~
Table 46; BSRIE (1963), Table 50; and BSRIE (1969), Table 68.
Percentage figures were calculated by dividing rupee figures by
corresponding rupee values of net national product given in ES
(1971), Tables 1.1 I and 1.2. 
’
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aThe figures include all 1 aid utilized up to the end of Plan I ; a
limited amount was utilized prior to 1951.
Sources: Gross foreign aid utilized: ES(1968), Table 7.3‘.
Debt service payments: ES (1971), Table 7.5~,-ES (1968), Table
10. 
’
Net foreign aid utilized: subtract debt service from gross aid.
Net national product: see sources for Table 2.
Government development expenditures: see sources for Table 2.
Total imports: see sources for Table 1.
·Rupee values converted to dollars at the official exchange rate.
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aincludes foreign investment in the Indian private sector only:
bAverage annual inflow since previous date of reference. These
figures are exclusive of asset revaluations which also affect the value of
outstanding investment.
CAt the end of the period.
Sou rces : Net capital 1 inflow: I BP (1963), Table X.’.; Fll I ( 1966) , Table 2-~;
IIIP (1969), Table 3.6;’;; IIIP (1971), Table 3. 6.’; . Valuc of f
outstanding investment: FI I (1966), Statement t I I I-~; I I IP (1971),
Statement t XI~~.
·Rupee values converted to dollars at the official exchange rate.
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aincludes foreign investment in the Indian private sector only.
Sources: See sources for Table 4.
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aThe Indian fiscal 1 year runs from April 1 1 to Ma rch 31.
Sources: Rupee values for all items were obtained from ESIIE (1965),
Table VIII; Bhatt t (1971), Table 5. ~’; Percentage figures were
calculated by dividing rupee figures by corresponding rupee
values of net national product given in ES (1971), Tables 1.1
and 1.2.
*The figures for net foreign capital I inflow given by Bhatt t for
1966-67 through 1969-70 were corrected to reflect the predevalua-
tion exchange rate so as to maintain comparability with the
, earlier years; this correction also affected the figures for net
investment, obtained as the sum of net domestic sav i ng and net
foreign capital 1 inflow...
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aT he Indian fiscal year runs from April I I to March 31.
Sources: Gross foreign aid utilized: ES(1968), Table 7.1-=; ES (1971),
Table 7.3~.
Debt t service payments: ES(1968), Table 10; ES(1971), Table 7.5*.
Net foreign aid utilized: Subtract debt service from gross aid.
·Rupee values converted to dollars at the official exchange rate.
94
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Alavi, Hamza, "Indian Capitalism and Foreign imperialism," New Left
Review No. 37 (May/June 1966).
2. Bettelheim, Charles, India Independent (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1968).
3. Bhagwati, Jagdish and Padma Desai, India: Planning for Industrializa-
tion (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).
4. Brecher, Michael, Nehru: A Political Biography (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1959).
5. Brown, Dorris D., Agricultural Development in India’s Districts
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
6. Chakravarty, Sukhamoy, "Growth or Stagnation in India," in Arthur 
MacEwan and Thomas Weisskopf (eds.), Perspectives on the Economic
Problem (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
7. Clairmonte, Frederick, Economic Liberalism and Underdevelopment (Bom-
bay : Asia Publishing House, 1960.
8. Dandekar, V.M. and Nilakantha, Rath, "Poverty in India," Economic and
Political Weekly (January 2 and 9, 1971).
9. Desai, A.R., Social Background of Indian Nationalism (Bombay: The
Popular Press, 1959).
10. Eldridge, P.J., The Politics of Foreign Aid in India (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969).
11. Frankel, Francine R., India’s Green Revolution (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1971).
12. Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Report of the Taxation
Enquiry Commission (New Delhi: 1955).
13. Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture and Ministry of
Community Development and Cooperation, Report on India’s Food
Crisis and Steps to Meet It (New Delhi: 1959).
14. Hanson, A.H., The Process of Planning: A Study of India’s Five-Year
Plans, 1950-1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).
15. Hazari, Bharat, "Import Intensity of Consumption in India," Indian
Economic Review (October, 1967).
16. Indian National Congress, Resolution on Economic Policy, Programme and
Allied Matters (1924-1969) (New Delhi: All-India Congress Com-
mittee, 1969).
17. Kidron, Michael, Foreign Investments in India (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1965).
18. Ladejinsky, Wolf, "Ironies of India’s Green Revolution," Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 4 (July 1970).
19. Lewis, John, "Wanted in India: A Relevant Radicalism," Economic and
Political Weekly (Special Number, July 1970).
20. Mazumdar, Harendrakumar, Business Saving in India (Groningen, Holland:
J.B. Wolters, 1959).
21. Moore, Jr., Barrington, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
22. Mukherjee, M. and G.S. Chatterjee, "Trends in Distribution of
National Income, 1950-51 to 1965-66," Economic and Political
Weekly (July 15, 1967.
23. Pavlov, V.I., The Indian Capitalist Class (New Delhi: People’s Pub-
lishing House, 1964).
24. Sen, Bhowani, Evolution of Agrarian Relations in India (New Delhi:
People’s Publishing House, 1962).
25. Sinha, L.P. The Left-Wing in India (Muzaffarpur: New Publishers,
1965).
26. Srinivasan, T.N., "The Green Revolution or the Wheat Revolution?,"
Indian Statistical Institute Discussion Paper No. 66 (October
1971).
27. Tanzer, Michael, The Political Economy of International Oil and the
Underdeveloped Countries (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).
28. Thorner, Daniel, "Ploughing the Plan Under," in Daniel and Alice
Thorner, Land and Labour in India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House,
1962).
29. Weisskopf, Thomas E. "Capitalism, Underdevelopment and the Future of
the Poor Countries," in Jagdish Bhagwati (ed.), Economics and




1. Bhatt, V.V., "The Economy: Current Situation and Policy Problems,"
Economic and Political Weekly (March 20, 1967).
2. BSRIE: Government of India, Planning Commission, Statistics and Sur-
veys Division, Basic Statistics Relating to the Indian Economy
(New Delhi: 1961, 1963, and 1969).
3. ES: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey (New
Delhi: 1968 and 1971).
4. ESIIE: "Estimates of Saving and Investment in the Indian Economy,"
Reserve Bank of India Bulletin (March 1965).
5. FCII: Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Collaboration in Indian Industry:
Survey Report (Bombay: 1968).
6. FII: "Foreign Investments in India," Reserve Bank of India Bulletin
(April 1966).
7. FRNIC: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Final Report of the
National Income Conmittee (New Delhi: 1954).
8. FSJSCI: Reserve Bank of India, Financial Statistics of Joint Stock
Companies in India, 1950-51 to 1962-63 (Bombay: 1967).
9. IBP: Reserve Bank of India, India’s Balance of Payments: 1948-49 to
1961-62 (Bombay: 1963).
10. IFLA: Reserve Bank of India, Census (Survey) of India’s Foreign
Liabilities and Assets (Bombay: 1950, 1955, and 1964).
11. IIIP: "India’s International Investment Position," Reserve Bank of
India Bulletin (August 1969 and March 1971).
